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ARGUMENT
I. THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS CONSTITUTIONAL
In the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Congress addressed critical
problems in the $2.5 trillion interstate health care market and the $854 billion health insurance
market that it encompasses.  ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(B), 10106(a).  As part of its regulation of these
markets, the ACA requires consumers to obtain a minimum level of health insurance coverage. 
Congress expressly found that this “requirement regulates activity that is commercial and
economic in nature — economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid
for, and when insurance is purchased.”  Id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(A) , 10106(a).  Those who “choos[e] to
forgo insurance . . . are making an economic decision to try to pay for health care services later,
out of pocket, rather than now through the purchase of insurance.”  Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, No. 10-11156, 2010 WL 3952805, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2010). 
For more than 70 years, the Supreme Court has recognized congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause to address conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce.  E.g.,
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).  Here, Congress specifically found that economic
decisions about how to pay for health care in the aggregate shift tens of billions of dollars of
health care costs each year, from the uninsured, who frequently are unable to pay for the medical
services they receive, onto other participants in the health care market.  ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(F),
10106(a).  That, as Congress found, is a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Id. §§ 1501
(a)(1), (2)(F), 10106(a).  It takes no “metaphysical gymnastics,” but rather a straightforward
application of the long-accepted constitutional standard to determine that Congress has the
power to regulate this economic activity.  Thomas More, 2010 WL 3952805, at *9; accord
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-15, 2010 WL 4860299, at *14-15 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010).
1
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Any assessment of plaintiffs’ challenge to this regulation must consider it in context, with
other key reforms in the ACA that it enables.  In particular, Congress in the ACA undertook to
regulate the terms of health insurance policies, as it has regulated many other financial products
sold in interstate commerce, to protect millions of Americans who otherwise could not obtain
insurance coverage.  The ACA thus requires that insurance companies offer policies even to
those who have pre-existing conditions, and prohibits discrimination, such as charging higher
rates, against people with pre-existing conditions.  Id. § 1201.  Congress adopted the minimum
coverage provision challenged by plaintiffs because, as the congressional finding expressly
affirms, the provision “is essential” to those reforms, “to creating effective health insurance mar-
kets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude
coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.”  Id. § 1501(a)(2)(I).  Under the straightforward
test set forth in Raich, 545 U.S. at 26-27, the minimum coverage provision falls within
Congress’s commerce powers because it is an “essential part of the larger regulatory scheme.”
Plaintiffs downplay the established tests of Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause and import a new standard that would bar Congress from imposing requirements on
citizens who are not already actively engaged in commerce.  This categorical prohibition applies,
plaintiffs contend, even if the economic decisions Congress regulates substantially affect
interstate commerce, and even if the regulation is necessary to effectuate reforms that are
authorized under the Commerce Clause.  Aside from wrongly deeming the uninsured “inactive,”
plaintiffs’ approach revives the type of categorical demarcation of Congress’s commerce powers
that the Supreme Court abandoned in the 1930s, and in so doing, invents an exclusion that
appears nowhere in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.   No case — ever — has imposed such a
limitation on Congress’s power to ameliorate substantial adverse effects on interstate commerce. 
2
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And Raich pronounces no “inactivity” exception to Congress’s authority to adopt measures that
are essential to reforms within its commerce powers.  In essence, plaintiffs’ new test has little to
do with the scope of the Commerce Clause, but instead seeks to vindicate their due process
claim, previously rejected by this Court, that the ACA impairs the freedom “to eschew entering
into a contract.”  Slip op. at 59 (Oct. 14, 2010) [Doc. No. 79].  This claim, however, is no more
valid when repackaged as a challenge to Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause than it
was when lodged under the Due Process Clause.
A. The Minimum Coverage Provision Regulates Economic Activity
Plaintiffs concede that “[t]he purchase of health care services” is “actual commerce.” 
Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Opp’n”) 8.  After pausing to argue that
such purchases are “typically . . . local and intrastate” (notwithstanding striking counter-
examples provided in the amicus brief of four of the plaintiff states’ own governors1), plaintiffs
also concede, as they must, that Congress may regulate such commercial transactions.  Id. at 8 &
n.2; see, e.g., Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329 (1991) (although hospital’s
“primary activity is the provision of health care services in a local market, it also engages in
interstate commerce”).  
Plaintiffs also seem to concede, or at least not to contest, what Congress understood —
that participation in the market for health care services is virtually universal.  See Pls.’ Opp’n 20-
21.  “[N]early everyone will require health care services at some point in their lifetimes, and it is
not always possible to predict when one will be afflicted by illness or injury or require care.” 
Liberty, 2010 WL 4860299, at *15; accord Thomas More, 2010 WL 3952805, at *9.  No
1 See Br. of Governors of Washington, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Michigan as Amici
Curiae 9 [Doc. No. 133] (Harborview Medical Center in Seattle had more than 12,000 out-of-
state customers in 2009 alone).
3
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plaintiff here suggests that he or she is the cloistered exception who can confidently forswear
any future need to purchase medical services.  The ACA thus satisfies the Supreme Court’s test
of regulating activities that have substantial effects on interstate commerce.
Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary incorrectly assumes the existence of some hermetic
seal between the health care market — where they concede (or at least do not contest) the
existence of regulable “activity” — and the health insurance market, which they say is “another
type of commerce.”  Pls.’ Opp’n 7.  This newly minted assumption then propels plaintiffs’
argument that, no matter how strong the need or how solid the authority Congress may have to
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce in the health care services
market, it cannot also regulate the health insurance market unless it can separately point to
“activity,” not just by tens of millions of participants in that second market, but by every person
subject to the regulation.  Id. at 7-8, 22-23.
The health care and health insurance markets are much more closely related than plain-
tiffs presuppose.  To be sure, those markets are not identical, and they need not be to permit 
Congress — without undertaking “Orwellian efforts” at “redef[inition]” (id. at 10) or con-
structing some attenuated “daisy-chain” (id. at 8) — to recognize in its regulatory scheme how
intertwined these markets are.  Most who have sought medical care at a doctor’s office or
hospital have experienced those interrelationships firsthand, as the discussion of insurance
generally precedes, influences, and often determines the course of treatment.  As the economic
scholars explain in their amicus brief, “[g]iven the extremely high costs of health care for all but
the most routine of treatments, the cost of medical care is beyond the means of all but the very
most wealthy Americans,” so “[i]nsurance is the means by which we pay for” such health care, a
“mechanism for spreading the costs of that medical care across people or over time.”  Br. of
4
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Economic Scholars as Amici Curiae 3, 9 [Doc. No. 125].  Plaintiffs note that health care may be
purchased on a “pay-as-you-go basis” in addition to through insurance.  Pls.’ Opp’n 8.  But, as
plaintiffs later acknowledge, when the “go” part of this equation transpires, the option of paying
through “insurance” is long gone.  Id. at 22.  As the economic scholars explained, “pay-as-you-
go” thus may well mean “default-as-you-go,” given the potentially catastrophic health costs that
serious injury or illness entail.  See Br. Econ. Scholars at 6-8.  In short, while health insurance is
not the only way to pay for health care services, it is an essential mechanism for the health care
market to function.  Thus, it is simple “market reality” that “[h]ow participants in the health care
services market pay for such services has a documented impact on interstate commerce.” 
Thomas More, 2010 WL 3952805, at *9.
The first two courts to have decided the constitutionality of the minimum coverage
provision under the Commerce Clause have both recognized that this close linkage of health care
and health insurance confounds plaintiffs’ claim that the ACA regulates in the absence of pre-
existing activity: “The “fundamental need for health care and the necessity of paying for such
services received” creates the market in health care services, of which nearly everyone is a
participant.  Regardless of whether one relies on an insurance policy, one’s savings, or the
backstop of free or reduced-cost emergency room services, one has made a choice regarding the
method of payment for health care services one expects to receive.”  Liberty, 2010 WL 4860299,
at *15 (quoting Thomas More, 2010 WL 3952805, at *9).  As those courts both concluded, “[f]ar
from ‘inactivity,’ by choosing to forgo insurance, Plaintiffs are making an economic decision to
try to pay for health care services later, out of pocket, rather than now, through the purchase of
insurance.”  Id.; accord Thomas More, 2010 WL 3952805, at *8-9.  And, as Congress observed,
ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a), that economic choice is often unavailing and leads to
5
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uncompensated care, the costs of which are borne by others.  Liberty, 2010 WL 4860299, at *14;
Thomas More, 2010 WL 3952805, at *9.
Even if the health insurance market somehow were considered as wholly apart from the
health care services market to which it is essential, plaintiffs could not show that everyone
affected by the minimum coverage provision is “inactive.”2  Plaintiffs’ argument is static, relying
on freeze-framed stills that do not capture the activity of dynamic markets.  Even before the
ACA, a substantial majority of those without insurance coverage at some point during any given
year had moved in or out of coverage during that same year.  CBO, How Many Lack Health
Insurance and For How Long? at 4, 9 (May 2003), available at www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=
4210&type=1 (all Internet addresses last visited Dec. 6, 2010); see also CBO, Key Issues in
Analyzing Major Health Insurance Proposals 11 (Dec. 2008) (Defs.’ Ex. 2).  Buying or dropping
insurance, not to mention procuring medical services, qualifies as “activity” under plaintiffs’
own theory.  And it is activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, by, among other
things, raising the premiums for other insureds.  The existence of such substantial effects
remains the touchstone of Congress’s commerce powers.  The ACA satisfies that test.
B. Where Necessary and Proper to the Exercise of an Enumerated Power,
the United States May Require The Purchase of Insurance
There is no need for the Court to decide whether Congress can regulate “inactivity”
because the minimum coverage requirement regulates activity.  Plaintiffs’ argument that
Congress is categorically forbidden from compelling “activity” from otherwise “inactive”
2 Defendants do not suggest that any person affected by the provision is properly
understood to be inactive.  But, in this facial challenge, the burden is plaintiffs to show that “no
set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745 (1987), so no inquiry beyond whether some people affected by the provision are
active is required.
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citizens no matter how necessary it may be to an overall regulation of interstate commerce is, in
any event, mistaken.  That argument confuses two different senses or types of “power.”
It is well established that “where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of
interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.’” 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting United States v. Wright-
wood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942)) (emphasis added).  The point is not merely that
Congress, in carrying out its Commerce Clause power, may call upon its other enumerated
powers, for example, its powers to grant letters of marque or establish post offices.  Rather the
point is, as the Court explained in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405-23 (1819), that in
order to exercise its enumerated powers, the federal sovereign is vested under the Necessary and
Proper Clause with the ordinary “means,” or powers, of execution.3
The power not merely to regulate what citizens do once they act but to compel action in
the first instance is one of these ordinary means.  And in fact, plaintiffs do not dispute that
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to require individuals to act.  Congress
required motels in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), to serve
African-American customers.  It required the farmer in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129
(1942), to buy wheat for his own use rather than grow it all himself.  It requires that owners of
commercial buildings ensure access by the disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-82, and it requires
insurers to offer employees a degree of portability for coverage offered through the workplace,
3 Plaintiffs do briefly acknowledge the Necessary and Proper Clause’s “adjunct or
incidental” authority for carrying into execution the enumerated powers, Pls.’ Opp’n 6, but this
concept plays no role in plaintiffs’ discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see id. at 18-
21, in which plaintiffs confuse the instrumental power of ordering citizens to act with the
substantive police power, id. at 18-19.
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29 U.S.C. § 1161.4  What plaintiffs appear to dispute is Congress’s power to require individuals
to act in the absence of “pre-existing activity.”  To be sure, “pre-existing activity” is not a
prerequsite for any congressional action.  Congress can and does regulate under the Commerce
Clause absent pre-existing activity, for example, by prohibiting certain conduct, to prevent
activity from occurring, or by adopting environmental regulations, limiting certain types of
research, or seeking to revive a market that has become moribund.  Plaintiffs’ claim thus boils
down to the assertion that when Congress regulates in the absence of pre-existing economic
activity, it cannot use regulatory tools available in other contexts.  No case has ever imposed
such a limitation on Congress’s choice of means under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and
there is no principled basis for imposing it now.
The eminent domain cases illustrate why such a limit is incompatible with the juris-
prudence regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Eminent domain is not itself an
enumerated power.  E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 511 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).  It is, however, a power that pertains to the United States as sovereign and is thus
one of the means or “agencies for exerting [the enumerated powers] which are appropriate or
necessary, and which are not forbidden by the law of its being.”  Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367, 372 (1875).  And Congress can exercise the power of eminent domain where necessary and
proper to effectuate an enumerated power, without regard to whether the property owner is
engaged in economic activity.
Plaintiffs try unsuccessfully to distinguish eminent domain cases on another point.  They
4 Plaintiffs are thus wrong in claiming that Jacobson v. Masschusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25
(1905), deemed the ability to compel conduct the defining attribute of the police power.  Pls.’
Opp’n 15 n.9.  That discussion of the police power pertained to the subject of regulation, not the
means that are necessary and proper to effectuate it.
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argue that eminent domain is not an example of compelled activity in the Commerce Clause
context because “forced sale” is a “euphemistic[]” way of referring to what is actually a
“taking.”  Pls.’ Opp’n 17 n.12.  There is no euphemism in “forced,” and “forced sale” is at least
as accurate a description as “taking” (which does not capture the compensatory part of the
transaction as “sale” does).5
In sum, where, as here, the subject of the regulatory scheme is interstate commerce (the
health care and health insurance markets), plaintiffs can invoke neither precedent nor logic to
support their effort to rule out a category of regulatory tools available to Congress under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to make its regulatory scheme effective.
C. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Necessary and Proper
Means to Achieve the Reforms of the Health Insurance Market
As defendants explained in their opening brief, the minimum coverage provision is
essential to the insurance industry reforms that ban denying coverage or charging more based on
pre-existing conditions.  Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ SJ Mem.”) 19-22
[Doc. No. 82-1].  Plaintiffs deny that the minimum coverage provision was intended to serve that
purpose.  Pls.’ Opp’n 19-21.  Congress, however, plainly stated that intended purpose:
Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health Service Act (as added by section
1201 of this Act), if there were no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase
health insurance until they needed care.  By significantly increasing health insurance
coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize
this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.  The [minimum coverage]
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in which improved
5 Plaintiffs also argue that it is “the land, and not the landowner” that is the subject of the
government’s regulation.  Id.  But one might as well argue that it is the premiums and the
insurance policies, not the insureds, that are regulated here (by contrast, in some other examples
of compelled activity, like posse or jury service, nothing but personal service will do).  While
there are differences between land and fungible money or contracts, they do not support the
bright-line constitutional distinction plaintiffs attempt to create.
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health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-
existing conditions can be sold.
ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 10106(a) (emphasis added).6
Plaintiffs argue that even without a minimum coverage provision, the guaranteed issue
and community rating reforms “still could be implemented in some fashion as effective commer-
cial regulations.”  Pls.’ Opp’n 20-21.  Plaintiffs do not explain how this could be done.  Several
states have already tried that route, and those attempts failed.  See Defs.’ SJ Mem. 21 n.7.  Plain-
tiffs’ bare hope cannot trump a specific congressional finding that the minimum coverage pro-
vision was essential to these reforms, a finding that merits substantial deference from this Court.
In any event, even if there were some other, or even better, way of achieving the
objective of health insurance reforms, Congress would be entitled to choose which means to use:
“Where various systems might be adopted for [a] purpose, it might be said with respect to each,
that it was not necessary because the end might be obtained by other means.  Congress must
possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact
conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution.”  United States v. Fisher, 6
U.S. 358, 396 (1805); accord, e.g., M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 413-14 (“To employ the means
necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the
end, and not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely
unattainable”).  The means need only be “rationally related to the implementation of a
constitutionally enumerated power.”  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010). 
6 The President likewise explained that the Act would allow everyone to have “some
basic security when it comes to their health care.”  Pls.’ Opp’n 20 (quoting Remarks by the
President at Signing of the Health Insurance Reform Bill (Mar. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing-health
-insurance-reform-bill).
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It need not be the only possible way to implement that power.
Plaintiffs also argue that to “[u]phold” the minimum coverage provision “as ‘essential’
to the ACA’s insurance regulations would license Congress . . . to create and expand its own
regulatory power through the simple expedient of legislating in such a manner as to create its
own ‘necessity.’”  Pls.’ Opp’n 21.  The predicate for invoking, and thus the inherent limitation
on, the Necessary and Proper Clause is that Congress must be effectuating an enumerated power. 
If the appropriate invocation of that power necessitates use of particular means, that is what the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes.  If Congress “create[d] its own ‘necessity’” here (as
plaintiffs use the phrase) then it did so as well in Wickard by adopting a purpose of stimulating
higher wheat prices, 317 U.S. at 129, and in Raich by choosing to ban interstate commerce in
marijuana, 545 U.S. at 13-15.  The desirability or wisdom of Congress’s goals can be open to
dispute, and opponents can pursue — and indeed in this case are pursuing — their own
legislative alternatives.  But the issue in this judicial forum relates to constitutional authority, not
policy preference.  Where Congress seeks a purpose within its enumerated powers — and not
even plaintiffs dispute that the guaranteed issue and community rating insurance reforms satisfy
that test — then Congress may choose means necessary and proper to achieve those reforms. 
Plaintiffs’ notion that Congress in so doing somehow “create[d] its own ‘necessity’” cannot be
reconciled with the principles the Court has applied since McCulloch v. Maryland.
D. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Activity-Inactivity Distinction Does Not Supply
Appropriate Limiting Principles for Application of the Commerce Power
Defendants’ argument recognizes and respects the principle that the Commerce Clause
not expand to “embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace
them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what
11
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is national and what is local.”  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).  “[I]n
the nature of things,” the operative limitations often “cannot be” captured in “precise
formulations.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995), or rigid categories.
Plaintiffs propose a precise formulation, a categorical rule against using any means of
regulating interstate commerce that includes compelling action from those not already in the
same narrowly defined slice of the market Congress is regulating.7  They again imagine all
manner of hypothetical laws that supposedly could be adopted to govern other markets.  But
comparing surgery to orange juice is not particularly apt.  Pls.’ Opp’n 10-12.  As defendants
explained in opposing plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the failure to purchase health
insurance imposes substantial effects on interstate commerce because of the unique combination
of features that characterize the health care and health insurance markets — a combination that is
present in no other market, including other necessity markets.  See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for
Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 8-9 [Doc. No. 137].
Fundamentally, the Supreme Court’s standard allowing regulation under the Commerce
Clause to address substantial effects on interstate commerce is a means of distinguishing
between what is local and what is national.  That distinction reflects the core function of the
Commerce Clause in empowering Congress to regulate interstate commerce.  Plaintiffs’ overlay,
differentiating between what is active and inactive, passes this distinction in the night.  The
problems Congress addressed in the ACA are not local.  As Congress correctly found, the health
care and health insurance markets extend — deeply — into the national economy as well.  The
7 As explained in defendants’ opening brief, prior Commerce Clause cases had no need to
refer to anything beyond activity, so while they addressed distinctions between economic and
non-economic activity, they did not reach or even address the distinction proposed by plaintiffs. 
Defs.’ SJ Mem. 31-32.  (Of course, as explained above, and in defendants’ prior briefs, there is
economic activity here, so there is likewise no reason to reach the question in this case.)
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minimum coverage provision, a quintessential economic regulation, addresses substantial effects
that are national in scope, and that operate on a vast interstate market.
II. THE AMENDMENTS TO MEDICAID FALL WITHIN THE SPENDING POWER
Plaintiffs’ opposition marks a remarkable about-face in their coercion theory.  They
previously claimed that the Medicaid amendments are coercive because they are not fully funded
by the federal government, and thus place fiscal burdens on already-strained state budgets.  See,
e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 84; Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dism. 3, 48 [Doc. No. 68]; Pls.’ SJ
Mem. 2, 25.  Now, they concede that the ACA’s net cost to the states is legally irrelevant, Pls.’
Opp’n 29, and instead argue that the amendments are coercive because they offer states too much
federal funding:
If anything, enhanced federal funding underscores the ever-increasing power that the
ACA exerts over the States: the more the federal government spends, the more it taxes
resources away from residents and businesses of the States; the greater the diversion of
local resources to Washington, D.C., the greater the States’ need for subsidies from the
federal government; and the greater the States’ need for subsidies, the stronger the federal
government’s position to dictate coercive and arbitrary conditions which the States must
accept.
Id. at 28.  This latest stop in plaintiffs’ search for a coherent legal theory is less an assertion of
coercion than it is a wholesale attack on Congress’s authority to tax and spend for the general
welfare — a power on which the Constitution places no dollar limit.  In any event, plaintiffs’
doomsday predictions lack empirical support.  In fact, the CBO determined that the ACA would
reduce the deficit.  And even if the federal tax burden were relevant here — and it is not —
federal tax revenues, as a percentage of gross domestic product, have remained essentially static
for the last 60 years.8
8 See, e.g., W. Kurt Hauser, There’s No Escaping Hauser’s Law, Wall St. J., Nov. 26,
2010 (federal tax revenues have hovered around 19 percent of GDP since the early 1950s),
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703514904575602943209741952
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More to the point, plaintiffs’ new spin on the coercion theory would require the Court to
accept the backward proposition that the more federal funding Congress provides — here,
between 90 and 100 percent of expenditures for the newly Medicaid-eligible — the less able it is
to impose conditions on how that money is spent.  That cannot be.
A. The Medicaid Expansion Will Help, Not Harm, State Budgets
Before launching into an extended discussion about the ACA’s supposed effect on their
budgets, the plaintiffs offer a startling concession.  Despite their prior claims to the contrary,
plaintiffs now say that whether the ACA actually costs or saves the states money is “legally
irrelevant” to their coercion claim.  Pls.’ Opp’n 29; see also id. at 41-42.  Defendants agree,
though perhaps for a different reason: Whether a conditional spending program would require a
state to increase net expenditures may affect that state’s decision to participate.  But that issue is
not material to whether the program is a permissible exercise of the spending power. 
Regardless, a state is free to accept the federal funding and the attached conditions, or not.
The parties’ apparent agreement on this point renders further discussion of the subject
unnecessary.  Nevertheless, given plaintiffs’ hyperbolic contention that the ACA will “run State
budgets off the proverbial cliff,” Pls.’ Opp’n 33, and their continued overstatement of potential
costs, failure to account for likely savings, and myriad other errors, a brief response is
warranted.9
.html; CEA, Economic Report of the President, at 424 tbl.B-79 (Feb. 2010) (listing federal
receipts, as a percentage of gross domestic product, for fiscal years 1937-2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/economic-report-president.pdf.
9 Plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ statement of facts [Doc. No. 136] is rife with
inaccuracies, which space constraints preclude defendants from fully refuting here.  While
defendants highlight some of the more significant ones here, these are but the tip of the iceberg.
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To begin, plaintiffs’ claim that it is “preposterous” that the ACA could actually save
states money, Pls.’ Opp’n 41, is refuted by one of their own.  Plaintiff Pennsylvania projects that
the Act will save the state between $283 and $651 million through 2018.  Press Release, Penn.
Office of the Governor, Governor Rendell Signs Order Starting to Implement Health Care
Reforms (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.governor.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/
community/news_and_media/2999/news_releases/665417.10
Plaintiffs focus their fire on a single study by the Council of Economic Advisers, which
found that the savings from just two areas — the elimination of duplicative state programs, and
the reduction in the “hidden tax” on premiums — were estimated at $11 billion per year after
2013.  Plaintiffs argue that this report is not credible for a variety of unpersuasive reasons.11  But
while quibbling about precise dollar amounts, plaintiffs do not dispute that, in general, the states’
projections ignore such savings entirely.  Nor do plaintiffs raise a serious challenge to the
independent analyses that predict similar savings.  See Defs.’ SJ Mem. 41 n.12 (citing, e.g., John
10 Likewise, Maryland estimates a savings of $621 million to $1 billion through 2020. 
Md. Health Care Reform Coord. Coun., Interim Report, Appendix F, at 23 (July 26, 2010),
available at http://www.healthreform.maryland.gov/interimreport.html.
11 For example, plaintiffs contend that the CEA report is flawed because it credits states
with savings that will actually accrue to local governments.  Pls.’ Opp’n 38-39.  But plaintiffs
neglect to mention that states finance a significant percentage of local expenditures on public
health, and thus benefit from savings at the local level.  For example, a 2008 study of all 67 local
health departments in Florida found that 40 percent of their revenue comes from the state.  See
Nat’l Ass’n of County and City Health Officials, 2008 National Profile of Local Health
Departments, at 21 fig.3.8 (2009), available at http://www.naccho.org/topics/infrastructure/
profile/resources/ 2008report/upload/NACCHO_2008_ProfileReport_post-to-website-2.pdf. 
Because of this relationship, local savings mean state savings.  In addition, plaintiffs assert that
the CEA report includes savings from CHIP that some states have already accounted for.  Pls.’
Opp’n 39.  In fact, while the CEA report mentions that “further savings may come” from CHIP,
it expressly “does not include savings on CHIP in the bottom line calculations of net savings.” 
CEA, The Impact of Health Insurance Reform on State and Local Governments, at 7-8 (Sept. 15,
2009) (Defs.’ Ex. 33).
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Holahan & Stan Dorn, Urban Institute, What Is the Impact of the [ACA] on the States?, at 2
(June 2010) (“[S]tate and local governments would save approximately $70-80 billion over the
2014-2019 period by shifting” current spending “on either state-funded health coverage or
uncompen-sated care” into “federally matched Medicaid, clearly exceeding the new cost to states
of the Medicaid expansion.”).12
In addition, plaintiffs repeatedly assert that defendants’ projections are misleading
because they overlook the effect of ACA § 2304, see Pls.’ Opp’n 29, 40, 41, which they
characterize as imposing a “new requirement that the States (but not the federal government) be
responsible for the provision of health care services,” and which they speculate “could lead to
tremendous costs for the states,” id. 29 (second emphasis added).  But plaintiffs have conceded
that Section 2304 is “unclear in its import and effect, and thus not amenable to cost projections.” 
Pls.’ SJ Mem. 42 n.42; see also id. Ex. 16 at 2 ¶ 4, 4 ¶ 6 (Nevada) (impact “unclear” and “cannot
be assessed until regulations are promulgated” by CMS).13
Plaintiffs compound the flaws in their argument by repeating significant errors that
defendants have previously noted.  For one, they again assert that the ACA requires states to
relinquish additional drug rebates they had negotiated with manufacturers.  Pls.’ Opp’n 41.  In
fact, the federal government will recapture only the amount by which rebates exceed the levels
set under prior law; thus, states that were receiving additional rebates before the ACA will
12 Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that the Holahan & Dorn study does not explain its data
sources and overestimates savings because the ACA will not totally eliminate uncompensated
care.  Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. of Facts ¶ 57.  In fact, that study explicitly cites the study that
was its data source, and explains that it adjusted those data to account for “expected health cost
growth” and, moreover, “assum[ed] that states could save just half of the cost” of spending on
such care.  Holahan & Dorn, supra, at 2 (emphasis added).
13 Thus, as defendants have explained, plaintiffs lack standing to challenge ACA § 2304
(and any such challenge is unripe).  See Defs.’ Opp’n 21 n.14.
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continue to keep them.  See Defs.’ Opp’n 32-33.  Plaintiffs’ own supplemental exhibits confirm
this.  See Pls.’ Opp’n Supp. Ex. 1, Attach. A, at 5 (Nebraska) (“Based on [HHS] instructions . . .
no impact will occur to the rebates currently accruing to the state budget.”) (emphasis added).
Moreover, plaintiffs continue to mischaracterize the Act’s maintenance-of-effort
provisions, repeatedly asserting that they prevent states from reducing any optional Medicaid
spending.  Pls.’ Opp’n 29, 31, 32, 41.  In fact, as defendants have explained, see Defs.’ Opp’n
28-29, while those provisions preclude a state from tightening its eligibility standards, they do
not prevent states from adjusting optional covered benefits, copayments, provider payment rates,
and many other features of their programs — and thus leave states with significant discretion to
control costs.  Thus, while plaintiffs correctly observe that 60 percent of Medicaid spending in
2001 was considered optional, they neglect to note that fully half of that optional spending was
for optional services, see Pls.’ Opp’n Supp. Ex. 7, which are unaffected by the ACA’s
maintenance-of-effort requirement.14
A proper accounting shows that the ACA’s revenue-raising and cost-saving provisions
more than offset any increase in state Medicaid outlays under the Act.  Plaintiffs’ estimates to
the contrary are incomplete, inaccurate, and — as plaintiffs now concede — irrelevant to the
constitutionality of the Medicaid amendments.
B. Plaintiffs’ Coercion Claim Is Not Fit for Judicial Resolution
In any event, plaintiffs’ coercion claim is not justiciable because the theory cannot “be
applied with fitness to the relations between state and nation.”  Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
14 Moreover, beginning in 2011, many states will largely be exempt from the
maintenance-of-effort provisions: for states with budget deficits, those provisions will not apply
with respect to individuals above 133 percent of the federal poverty who are not pregnant or
disabled.  ACA § 2001(b).
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301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).  As several courts have held, the coercion theory provides no
judicially administrable standards, and essentially raises political questions that fall outside the
province of the judiciary.
Plaintiffs first suggest that the Court decided this question when it found, at the motion to
dismiss stage, that plaintiffs had stated a “plausible” claim for relief, and argue that the Court
need not revisit that conclusion.  Pls.’ Opp’n 42.  That is mistaken.  Defendants moved to
dismiss plaintiffs’ coercion claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  See Defs.’
Mot. to Dism. 1 [Doc. No. 55]; slip op. at 51.  That motion did not challenge the justiciability of
plaintiffs’ coercion claim — a distinct challenge that goes to the Court’s jurisdiction, and thus
falls under Rule 12(b)(1).  See, e.g., Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Serv., 572 F.3d 1271,
1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over political questions). 
And although the Supreme Court in Steward Machine expressly “assume[d]” that a coercion
claim was justiciable in order to reject it on the merits, 301 U.S. at 590, this Court could not rule
for plaintiffs on the merits of their coercion claim based on the same jurisdictional assumption.
Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, rather than merely accepting plaintiffs’
allegations as true, the Court applies a different legal standard to a different evidentiary record. 
Here, defendants have adduced evidence — which is largely uncontroverted — about the
interconnected political judgments that bear on the justiciability of plaintiffs’ coercion claim as
they have framed it: the significant variation in federal Medicaid spending from state to state; the
differences in the nature and scope of state Medicaid programs; and the various ways that states
choose to raise revenue — including through taxes — to fund their respective investments in
18
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public services.  Defs.’ SJ Mem. 45-47.15  It remains plaintiffs’ burden at each stage of the case
to demonstrate that their coercion claim presents a justiciable controversy over which the Court
has jurisdiction.  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006); Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).  The Court should undertake this inquiry in view of the
more developed record.
Plaintiffs concede that “the nature and scope of Medicaid programs and funding differ
according to States’ policies, sizes, and priorities.”  Pls.’ Opp’n 43.  And they do not dispute
that, by any measure, federal Medicaid grants vary dramatically from state to state.  In dollar
terms, those grants ranged from $246 million (Wyoming) to $23.8 billion (New York) in fiscal
year 2008 — a nearly 100-fold difference.  Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. of Facts ¶ 62.  And as a
percentage of state revenues, they ranged from 4.4 percent (Alaska) to 21.5 percent (Missouri). 
Id. ¶ 65.  Plaintiffs insist, however, that these state-to-state differences do not matter, and focus
instead on generalities about the Medicaid program as a whole and the size of the average
federal Medicaid grant.  But if the concept of “coercion” can be applied at all, it must be in a
fact-specific context, for “[e]ven a rough assessment of the degree of temptation would require
extensive and complex factual inquiries on a state-by-state basis.”  Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655
F.2d 401, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981); cf. Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590 (coercion is “a question of
degree, at times, perhaps, of fact”).
15 Plaintiffs fail to place defendants’ evidence into dispute by asserting that it “speaks for
itself” or that they “lack knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny” it.  See, e.g., Pls.’
Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 61-67, 69-74 [Doc. No. 136].  At summary judgment, a
nonmoving party cannot rest on such general denials, but instead must point to specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 
Accordingly, these statements of fact should be “deemed to be admitted.”  N.D. Fla. Loc. R.
56.1(A).
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In any event, plaintiffs get even these general statistics wrong.  They mistakenly, and
repeatedly, assert that federal Medicaid funding constitutes, on average, 20 percent of state
budgets.  See Pls.’ Opp’n 43 (“[F]ederal support for the Medicaid programs in all States is quite
substantial, . . . averaging more than 20 percent of total State spending nationally.”); id. at 28
(a “withdrawal from Medicaid would mean the loss of funding . . . averaging 20 percent of
States’ budgets”).  In fact, that figure includes both federal and state dollars spent on Medicaid. 
The federal portion actually constitutes, on average, about 11.5 percent of total state expend-
itures.  See Nat’l Ass’n of State Budget Officers, Fiscal Year 2008 State Expenditure Report, at
6 tbl.1 & 47 tbl.28 (Fall 2009) (Defs.’ Ex. 40) [hereinafter NASBO Report].  Plaintiffs make the
same mistake with respect to Alaska and Pennsylvania, suggesting that federal Medicaid grants
constitute 8.4 percent and 30 percent, respectively, of those states’ total budgets.  Again, those
figures include both federal and state dollars spent on Medicaid.  In fact, federal Medicaid
funding constitutes about 4.4 percent of Alaska’s budget, see Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. of Facts
¶ 65, and about 16.3 percent of Pennsylvania’s, see NASBO Report at 6 tbl.1 & 47 tbl.28.
Plaintiffs also argue that these state-to-state variations are irrelevant because the size of
federal Medicaid grants makes them coercive for all states, even where those grants compose
only a small portion of state budgets.  See Pls.’ Opp’n 44 (coercion standard met “[r]egardless of
which State is considered”); id. at 43 (standard met at either end of spectrum “and for all States
in-between”).  Still, they offer the Court no principled way to determine the “point at which
pressure turns into compulsion.”  Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590.
Take Alaska, for example, whose $467 million federal Medicaid grant constitutes 4.4
percent of the state budget in fiscal year 2008.  Plaintiffs would have the Court deem this amount
coercive because it is the “largest” federal grant to Alaska.  Pls.’ Opp’n 44.  Or because it is “not
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a marginal” grant.  Id.  Or because it is a “significant percentage” of state funding.  Id. at 43.  But
at what point does a grant morph from “marginal” to “significant”?  When it comprises one
percent of a state’s budget?  Two percent?  Four?  By comparison, in fiscal year 2008, Alaska
also received $746 million in federal funds from the Department of Transportation, including
$399 million from the Highway Trust Fund alone.  See U.S. Census Bureau, Federal Aid to
States for Fiscal Year 2008, at 17 tbl.1 (July 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2009pubs/fas-08.pdf.  And it received $152 million in federal funds from the Department of
Education.  Id. at 5 tbl.1.  Were those grants also coercive?  Does it matter that Alaska has
chosen not to impose a personal income tax or a sales tax on its citizens and, instead, raises the
bulk of its revenue through severance taxes on oil and gas companies operating within its
borders?  See U.S. Census Bureau, State Government Tax Collections in 2009, at 3, 5 (May
2010), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/2009stcreport.pdf.
At bottom, plaintiffs offer no judicially administrable standards to apply to these many
questions.  Instead, they assert that the Court need not draw the line separating pressure from
coercion because, wherever its location, it is simply “apparent” that it has been crossed here, for
any and all states.  Pls.’ Opp’n 44.  On the contrary, any attempt to apply the coercion theory
must proceed on a state-by-state basis, see Oklahoma, 655 F.2d at 414, and would necessarily
turn on states’ varying choices about how much to invest in public services, and how to raise
revenue, including taxes, to fund those investments — decisions that each state’s citizens, acting
through their elected representatives, are always free to change.  See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d
445, 448 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989).  These are tough choices, no doubt, but undeniably political ones
that fall outside the competence of the courts to second-guess.  See, e.g., State Tax Comm’n v.
Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 184 (1942) (“[W]hether a tax is wise or expedient is the business of the
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political branches of government, not ours.”).  The Court should find plaintiffs’ coercion claim
nonjusticiable.
C. Even If this Claim Is Justiciable, the ACA’s Medicaid Provisions Are Not
Coercive
As defendants have established, no court has ever invalidated any conditional spending
program as coercive, by any measure:
# no matter how large the federal grant at stake;
# no matter what proportion of the state program the federal grant supports;
# no matter what proportion of the state’s total budget the federal grant represents;
# no matter the importance of the federal grant to critical state services, including
health care.
See Defs.’ SJ Mem. 47-49 (chronicling cases).  Plaintiffs do not dispute this.  Plaintiffs also do
not even acknowledge — let alone grapple with the reasoning of — the cases from the First,
Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits uniformly rejecting coercion challenges
to conditions imposed on the receipt of federal funds.  And while they suggest that this case is
different because of the “unprecedented funding levels at stake,” Pls.’ Opp’n 45, they studiously
ignore that entire Medicaid grants were also at stake in several of those cases — making them
utterly indistinguishable.  California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997);
Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401,
414 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
To save their coercion claim, plaintiffs discuss just three cases:  Dole, College Savings,
and Steward Machine.  None aids their cause.  Although it is true that Dole referred to the
withholding of 5 percent of federal highway funds as “relatively mild encouragement,” South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (cited in Pls.’ Opp’n 44), that “passage does not get
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[plaintiffs] far,” Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000).  “It is merely an
instance in which the Court acknowledged circumstances not sufficient to constitute coercion.” 
Id.  And while in College Savings, the dissent made the rhetorical point that, depending on the
circumstances, the withholding of a federal grant might be viewed as “more compelling and
oppressive” than an implied waiver of sovereign immunity, College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 697 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cited in
Pls.’ Opp’n 44, 47), that passage cannot reasonably be read to mean that Justice Breyer thought
that federal education or highway grants were unconstitutionally coercive.  In fact, he never so
much as mentioned coercion, Dole, or Steward Machine.  See id. at 696-97.  In any event, as
defendants have already explained, College Savings is not even a Spending Clause case and,
under Eleventh Circuit precedent, it is therefore inapposite.  See Defs.’ Opp’n 35-36 n.22 (citing
Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Plaintiffs’ attempt to marshal Steward Machine in support of their coercion claim fails
entirely.  See Pls.’ Opp’n 34, 42.  That case soundly refutes plaintiffs’ argument that it matters
for Spending Clause purposes that, if a state withdraws from Medicaid, “federal funds taken
from [its] citizens via taxation that used to flow back into the states from Washington, D.C.,
would instead be diverted to the states that have agreed to continue participating in the
program.”  Slip op. at 56 (cited in Pls.’ Opp’n 28 n.19, 46).  There, in rejecting a coercion claim
where states that declined to create unemployment insurance funds stood to lose up to a 90
percent share of federal unemployment taxes — totaling hundreds of millions of dollars — the
Supreme Court explicitly noted that “[i]f some of the states hold out in their unwillingness to
pass statutes of their own, the receipts” collected by the federal government and not returned to
the states “will be still larger.” Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 586 n.8.
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Moreover, plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Steward Machine is unpersuasive.  That the
statute at issue there involved a “wholly new” program rather than amendments to an existing
one, Pls.’ Opp’n 45, simply makes no difference.  Either way, the states are put to a new choice,
and either way, federal funding rides on the decision.  And it is no distinction at all to say that, in
Steward Machine, Congress offered “encouragement to States to administer an unemployment
compensation program,” while here, declining to participate in Medicaid would have “direct and
drastic consequences for State budgets.”  Id.  Such benefits and consequences are two sides of
the same coin.  Both here and in Steward Machine, Congress offered states a financial incentive
(federal funding) to encourage them to administer a public program (unemployment insurance or
Medicaid) in accordance with federal standards.
In the end, when considering a federal spending program, states are “ultimately free to
reject both the conditions and the funding, no matter how hard that choice may be.”  Kansas, 214
F.3d at 1203.  That freedom is not rendered illusory by the size of the grant or its importance to
state finances.  Oklahoma, 655 F.2d at 414.  If the law were otherwise, virtually any new
condition attached to the Medicaid program — or any other large federal spending program —
would be inherently coercive, and the more funding Congress chose to offer the states, the less
control it would have over how that money was spent.
D. The ACA’s Medicaid Amendments Satisfy the “General Restrictions” on the
Spending Power
Plaintiffs also attempt to fault defendants’ motion for summary judgment for “fail[ing] to
address” the Medicaid amendments’ compliance with the four “general restrictions” on the
spending power outlined in Dole.  See Pls.’ Opp’n 30, 48.  But defendants established in their
motion to dismiss that the Medicaid amendments satisfy each of those factors, see Mem. in
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Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dism. 12-13 [Doc. No. 56-1], a point that both defendants and the Court
noted that plaintiffs did not dispute.  See Reply in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dism. 2 [Doc. No. 74];
slip op. at 52 (“The plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that the Act meets these restrictions.”).
In any event, the Dole arguments in plaintiffs’ opposition brief duplicate those made in
their motion for summary judgment.  Compare Pls. Opp’n 48 [Doc. No. 135] with Pls.’ SJ Mem.
44-45 [Doc. No. 80-1].  For a complete response to those arguments, defendants respectfully
refer the Court to their opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.  See Defs.’ Opp’n
36-38 [Doc. No. 137].
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted,
and judgment should be entered in favor of defendants on Counts One and Four of the Amended
Complaint.
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